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We identify some challenges in RSU access problem. There are two main problems in V2R communication. (1) It is difficult
to maintain the end-to-end connection between vehicles and RSU due to the high mobility of vehicles. (2) The limited RSU
bandwidth resources lead to the vehicles’ disorderly competition behavior, which will give rise tomultiple RSUs having overlap area
environment where RSU access becomes crucial for increasing vehicles’ throughput. Focusing on the problems mentioned above,
the RSU access question in the paper is formulated as a dynamic evolutionary game for studying the competition of vehicles in the
single community and among multiple communities to share the limited bandwidth in the available RSUs, and the evolutionary
equilibrium evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is considered to be the solution to this game. Simulation results based on a realistic
vehicular traffic model demonstrate the evolution process of the game and how the ESS can affect the network performance.
1. Introduction
Vehicle ad hoc network (VANET) is a special case of mobile
ad hoc network. The motions of vehicles are restricted to a
geographical pattern. Further, the communication patterns of
VANET include vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and vehicle to road
side unit (V2R). RSU is referred to as road side unit, which
is a wireless transceivers and receivers and has the characters
of data storage, computing power, and router. In recent years,
V2R communication has received considerable attentions [1–
4]. In this paper, we mainly research the RSU access problem.
When vehicles drive through RSU, it will ask the RSU for
service requirements. However in VANET, (1) it is difficult
to maintain the end-to-end connection between vehicles and
RSU due to the high mobility of vehicles; (2) the limited RSU
bandwidth resources lead to the vehicles’ disorderly compe-
tition behavior, which may reduce the network throughput;
(3) due to the uneven distribution of vehicles, RSU’s load
may become diversification, which will lead to the load
imbalance of RSU. In order to solve the problems above and
achieve good network throughput, one question needs to be
addressed: in the highly dynamic network, when and which
RSU should be accessed. Focusing on the problem, the paper
puts forward evolutionary game theory.
Game theory provides a mathematical modeling for the
study of competition strategies in a game where players
have conflicting benefits or goals and consider the rivals’
strategy to make their own strategy [5, 6]. Evolutionary game
theory describes game models in which players choose their
strategies through a trial-and-error process in which they
learn over time that some strategies work better than others
[7, 8]. In this paper, we analyze the RSU access problem
under the framework of game theory as the vehicles are
noncooperative and competitive and need to consider the
strategy of other vehicles to make their own strategy. In
addition, vehicles are controlled by bounded rational entities,
such as human or organization [9], and the traditional game
theory assumed that the players are perfectly rational, so we
adopt the evolutionary game theory to analyze the access
problem.
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The research scene includes multiple vehicles versus
two RSUs and multiple vehicles versus multiple RSUs. We
divide the vehicles into different populations according to
the strategies. The two RSU’s scene belongs to a single-
community evolutionary game as all vehicles’ strategy set is
the same, while the multiple RSU’s scene belongs to multiple
communities evolutionary game as vehicles in different pop-
ulations have different strategies. The payoff function of our
model is the difference of the throughput and the cost. In our
paper, the cost contains two aspects: bandwidth occupation
cost and handoff cost.The Nash equilibrium is evolutionarily
stable strategy (ESS), that is, the probability of vehicles access
to RSU. In order to ensure the accuracy and reliability of
research results, the paper adopted the traffic flow simulator
VanetMobiSim to generate the real vehicle moving track.The
simulation results demonstrate the evolution process of the
game and how the ESS can affect the network performance.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized
as follows.
(1) An evolutionary game-theoretic approach is pre-
sented to solve the RSU access problem in VANET.
In particular, the replicator dynamics is quoted to
investigate the dynamics of vehicle behavior and
solution.
(2) Under two RSU’s scene and multiple RSU’s scene,
the paper sets up single-community and multiple-
community evolutionary game models to analyze
the dynamic evolutionary process and the effect on
network performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as the following.
Section 2 reviewed problem description. In Section 3, we
introduced the related work. Section 4 formalized the sys-
tem model, which includes single-community and multiple-
community evolutionary gamemodels.The numerical exper-
iments were performed in Section 5. Finally, we draw our
conclusions in Section 6.
In the paper, we also use the terms “population” and
“species” to refer to the VANET community.
2. Problem Definition
In VANET, vehicles have no Internet access and arrive
randomly in VANET; vehicles have to access to RSU if they
want to obtain the Internet services.
RSU broadcasts the beacon messages to vehicles period-
ically when the vehicle lies in the coverage area of an RSU,
from which the vehicle can get the current state information
of the RSU and the network. For simplicity, we assume that
RSU’s transmission range is equal, and we divide the road
into different areas according to the RSUs’ coverage area,
which is defined as 𝑆 = {𝑆
1
, 𝑆
2
, . . . , 𝑆
𝐾
}. As shown in Figure 1,
the road is divided into four areas 𝑆 = {𝑆
1
, 𝑆
2
, 𝑆
3
, 𝑆
4
}. In
different areas, vehicles can access different RSUs. Vehicle
requests services from RSU when driving through RSU, and
it can get the service profit from RSUs, while it also incurs a
cost in requesting for RSU, where the cost can be the price
that vehicles spend on RSUs’ bandwidth, buffer size, and
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Figure 1: The RSU’s access scene.
other resource. Besides, when vehicles drive from an RSU to
another, the vehicles have to pay for the handoff cost. The
payoff function of vehicles is
𝐹 = 𝑄
𝑗
𝑖
− 𝑃
𝑗
𝑖
− ℎ
𝑗
𝑖
, (1)
where 𝑄𝑗
𝑖
is the achievable throughput of vehicle 𝑖 got from
RSU 𝑗
𝑄
𝑗
𝑖
= 𝛿 ∗ (𝑇
𝑗
𝑖
− 𝑡
𝑗
) ∗ 𝑐
𝑗
𝑖
∗ 𝑁
𝑗 (2)
𝑇
𝑗
𝑖
is the time when vehicle 𝑖 is driving in the coverage area
of RSU 𝑗
𝑇
𝑗
𝑖
=
𝑅𝑗
V
𝑖
. (3)
𝑡𝑗 represents the communicate delay when vehicles commu-
nication with RSU 𝑗
𝑡
𝑗
=
𝑁𝑗
𝑓
𝑠
. (4)
𝑃
𝑗
𝑖
stands for the resource cost
𝑃
𝑗
𝑖
= 𝛽 ∗ 𝑁
𝑗
∗ 𝛼
𝑖
∗
𝑙
𝑖
𝑐
𝑗
𝑖
, (5)
where 𝑙
𝑖
/𝑐
𝑗
𝑖
is the time that vehicle 𝑖 should communicate with
RSU 𝑗 if it wants to finish its request. 𝛼
𝑖
is the importance
index of vehicle 𝑖’s request file. If 𝛼
𝑖
> 2, the request file is
urgent, such as emergency information, 1 < 𝛼
𝑖
< 2 means
that the request is less important, such as road information,
and the request is video and audio streams if 𝛼
𝑖
< 1.
𝑐
𝑗
𝑖
is the transmission rate of vehicle 𝑖
𝑐
𝑗
𝑖
= 𝑤
𝑗
∗ log
2
(1 +
𝑆/𝑁
𝑁𝑗 ∗ (𝑑
𝑗
𝑖
)
𝑟
) . (6)
ℎ
𝑗
𝑖
is the handoff cost
ℎ
𝑗
𝑖
= 𝜑 ∗ 𝑡left ∗ 𝑇left, (7)
where 𝑡left is the request files that have finished and𝑇left is the
distance that vehicles have driven in RSU’s coverage. Detailed
parameters are listed in Table 1.
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Table 1: The parameters.
Symbol Semantics
𝑁𝑗 The total number of vehicles in the coverage area of RSU j
𝑅𝑗 The transmission radius of RSU j
V
𝑖
The speed of vehicle i
𝑙
𝑖
The request file length of vehicle i
𝑆/𝑁 The signal-to-noise ratio
𝑑
𝑗
𝑖
The distance between vehicle i and RSU j
𝑤
𝑗 The link bandwidth of RSU j
𝑓𝑗
𝑠
The communication frequency of RSU j
𝛾 The path loss exponent
Φ, 𝛽, 𝛿 The weighting coefficient
3. Related Work
A number of previous results have been reported on the RSU
access problems. In [10], a distributed association algorithm
according to the number of mobile users (MUs) associated
with APs was introduced. Besides, reference [11] built a game
model according to the potential link rate and the number
of WSs access to RSU, which can ensure that each WS
gets achievable throughput. Reference [12] presented a new
load balancing technique by controlling the size of WLANs
(i.e., APs’ coverage range) to ensure the load balancing
among APs. As we know, vehicles in VANET are highly
mobile and the network typology changes dynamically, which
demonstrated that the approaches ignore VANET’s mobile
properties. Besides, these approaches only consider the profit
of RSU but vehicles and the papers above all assumed that the
players are perfectly rational, which did not fit the realities
that human and organizations and other players are bounded
rationality. In a word, these methods were not applicable for
VANET.
In recent years, evolutionary game theory has been
used in wireless network in many fields. Reference [13] that
showed the evolutionary game is used to obtain the forward
probability of nodes in two-hop DTN and analyze the
stability of ESS. In [14], the authors presented two algorithms,
namely, population evolution and reinforcement-learning
algorithms, for network selection and formulated the game
to model the competition among populations of users in the
different service areas in heterogeneous wireless networks.
Reference [15] presented amodel based on evolutionary game
theory (EGT) in which it demonstrated that the model was
able to encourage selfish nodes to cooperate and forward
packets from others with only one period of punishment if
nodes are sufficiently patient. As we know, the traditional
game theory has been used in VANET for some applications
[16–18]; however, the evolutionary game theory’s applications
in VANET are growing due to the following reasons. (1)The
evolutionary equilibrium of evolutionary game is a refined
solution, which ensures stability (i.e., population of players
will not change their chosen strategies over time). (2) An
evolutionary game changes their strategies slowly to achieve
the solution eventually, and the traditional game makes
decisions immediately. (3)The replicator dynamics is useful
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Figure 2: The two RSUs’ scene.
for investigating the trajectory of the players’ strategies [14].
In our paper, we solve the RSU access problem in VANET by
using evolutionary game.
4. Evolutionary Game Model
The evolutionary game for our paper can be described as
follows.
(i) Players: the vehicle in the coverage area of RSU is a
player of the game.
(ii) Population: the vehicles that have the same strategy
set are a population. In different populations, the
number of vehicles is defined separately as 𝑁 =
{𝑁
1, 𝑁2, . . . , 𝑁𝑗, . . .}.
(iii) Strategy: the strategy set is 𝑋𝑗 = {𝑥𝑗
0
, 𝑥
𝑗
1
, . . . , 𝑥
𝑗
𝑖
, . . . ,
𝑥
𝑗
𝑁
}, 𝑖 = 1, 2 . . . , 𝑁, where 𝑥𝑗
𝑖
means the access
probability that player 𝑖 chooses RSU 𝑗.
(iv) Payoff: the payoff function is𝐹 = 𝑄𝑗
𝑖
−𝑃
𝑗
𝑖
−ℎ
𝑗
𝑖
, which is
the difference of the throughput of that strategy and
the cost. In multiple communities, the payoff of the
vehicle depends on not only the strategy played by the
number of vehicles from the same population but also
other populations that participate to the game.
In this section, we present the evolutionary game model
in two RSU’s scene and multiple RSU’s scene, respectively.
4.1. Two RSUs’ Scene. As shown in Figure 2, in two RSU’s
scene, there is a set of vehicles who want to request services
from RSU1 and RSU2. Vehicles can only access RSU2 when
they enter S1 andmay change its selectionwhen they enter S2.
We assume that the vehicle needs to pay for the handover cost
if it does not finish its service request while it performs the
handoff operation. On the contrary, If the vehicles’ requested
services have been finished, the handoff cost is zero and
vehicles get their strategy based on their location, the file size,
service type, and so on. The vehicles in RSU1 and RSU2’s
coverage area are a single-community evolutionary game, in
which all vehicles’ strategy set is the same. The payoff matrix
is as described in Table 2.
In the game, we let𝑋 := {(𝑥, 𝑥−) | 𝑥+𝑥− = 1} be the set of
probabilities distributions of population i. x and y represent
the probabilities of vehicles in population i accessing RSU1
and RSU2, respectively, 1 − 𝑥 − 𝑦 means vehicles do not
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Table 2: Two RSUs’ payoff matrix.
RSU1 RSU2 None
RSU1 𝜃1 − 𝜑(𝑃1 + ℎ1) 𝜃1 − (𝑃1 + ℎ1) 𝜃1 − (𝑃1 + ℎ1)
RSU2 𝜃2 − (𝑃2 + ℎ2) 𝜃2 − 𝜑(𝑃2 + ℎ2) 𝜃2 − (𝑃2 + ℎ2)
None 0 0 0
access any RSUs’ probability, and 𝜑 is the congestion index.
The payoff function is as follows.
The profit of vehicles accessing RSU1 is
𝐹 (𝑥, 1) = 𝑥 ∗ (𝜃
1
− 𝜑 ∗ (𝑃
1
+ ℎ
1
)) + 𝑦 (𝜃
1
− (𝑃
1
+ ℎ
1
))
+ (1 − 𝑥 − 𝑦) ∗ (𝜃
1
− (𝑃
1
+ ℎ
1
)) .
(8)
The profit of vehicles accessing RSU2 is
𝐹 (𝑦, 2) = 𝑥 ∗ (𝜃
2
− (𝑃
2
+ ℎ
2
)) + 𝑦 ∗ (𝜃
2
− 𝜑 ∗ (𝑃
2
+ ℎ
2
))
+ (1 − 𝑥 − 𝑦) ∗ (𝜃
2
− (𝑃
2
+ ℎ
2
)) .
(9)
The payoff of vehicles in population 1 and population
2 which do not choose any RSU is 0.
The average payoff of populations is
𝐹 = 𝑥 ∗ 𝐹 (𝑥, 1) + 𝑦 ∗ 𝐹 (𝑦, 2) + (1 − 𝑥 − 𝑦) ∗ 0. (10)
In a dynamic evolutionary game, an individual from a
population, who is able to replicate itself through the process
of mutation and selection, is called replicator. In this case, a
replicator with a higher payoff can reproduce itself faster.The
game is a repeated game, and in each period, a player observes
the payoff of other players in the same community. Then, in
the next period, the player adopts a strategy that gives a higher
payoff.The speed of the vehicle in observing and adapting the
RSU access is controlled by the parameter 𝜇.
In the case of single community, the replicator dynamics
is:
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜇 [𝐹 (𝑥, 1) − 𝐹] ∗ 𝑥,
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜇 [𝐹 (𝑦, 2) − 𝐹] ∗ 𝑦.
(11)
4.2. Multiple RSUs’ Scene. Figure 3 depicts themultiple RSUs’
scene, in which vehicles in different populations have dif-
ferent strategies. So it is a multiple-community evolutionary
game. As shown in Figure 3, area 1 is the overlap area of
RSU1 and RSU2, and area 2 is the overlap area of RSU1,
RSU2, and RSU3. The set of strategies for the players in
area 1 is {RSU1,RSU2}, while that for the players in area
2 is {RSU1 RSU2,RSU3}. Area 1 and area 2 depict a two
community evolutionary game. The vehicles in multiple-
community evolutionary game will compete with each other
RSU1
RSU2
RSU3
1
2
Figure 3: Multiple RSUs’ scene.
within population and also carry on the competition among
the populations. During the evolutionary process, the vehi-
cles adjust their strategies according to their payoff until all
the vehicle’s strategies maintain stable, and the strategy is ESS
at this time.
The payoff function of vehicles in population 𝑖 accessing
RSU 𝑗 is
𝐹
𝑗
𝑖
= 𝜃
𝑗
𝑖
− 𝑃
𝑗
𝑖
− ℎ
𝑗
𝑖
. (12)
The payoff of vehicles in population 𝑖which do not access any
RSU is 0.
The average payoff of all populations is
𝐹𝑖 =
𝑀
∑
𝑗=1
𝑥
𝑖
𝑗
∗ 𝐹
𝑖
𝑗
. (13)
The replicator dynamics of population i is
𝑑𝑥
𝑖
𝑗
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜇 [𝐹
𝑗
𝑗
− 𝐹𝑖] ∗ 𝑥
𝑖
𝑗
. (14)
5. Simulations and Evaluations
VANET is a special network, it has a highly dynamic typology,
vehicles are highly mobile, and the motions of vehicles
are restricted to a geographical pattern. In order to make
the simulation results more realistic, we use VanetMobiSim
and Google Earth map tools to simulate traffic track. As
shown in Figure 4, the paper chooses Zhongshan district,
Dalian, as the simulation area, and the area size is 2.0 km
by 2.0 km. VanetMobiSim is a simulation tool which can
generate vehicle trajectory. In our simulation, we need to use
theVanetMobiSim to get themovement trajectory of vehicles.
We study the access problem through the following two
aspects: the evolutionary process of the ESS and the effect of
resource cost parameters on network performance.We set the
simulation parameters as described in Table 3.
In Figures 4 and 5, the horizontal axis stands for the
number of evolution, while the vertical axis stands for the
ESS.
Figure 4 demonstrates the influence on ESS along with
the vehicle speed, package size changing. In the simulationwe
set the number of vehicles as 150, the vehicles speed as 15m/s
for Figure 4(a), and the package size as 20 for Figure 4(b).
With size increment, the probability that vehicles finish their
service within RSU’s coverage area decreases, leading to the
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Figure 4: (a) The effect on ESS of packet size. (b) The effect on ESS of vehicle speed.
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Figure 5: (a) The number of vehicles in community is 100. (b) The number of vehicles in community is 70.
decrease in the probability that vehicles access RSU. Similarly,
the probability of vehicles accessing to RSU increases if the
speed decreases or the number of vehicles having accessed
RSU decreases.
Figure 5 shows the influence of 𝑁𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, 2, on ESS
in two-community evolutionary game. Figure 5(a) shows the
ESS when 𝑁𝑗 = 100 while Figure 5(a) shows the ESS when
𝑁𝑗 = 70. As the simulation result demonstrates that the traffic
load and the cost of RSU1, RSU2, and RSU3 in population
2 decrease when 𝑁2 reduces, which makes the vehicles in
population 2 would like to access RSU1, RSU2, and RSU3,
vehicles in population 1 are also more inclined to access RSU1
and RSU2 as they thought the number of vehicles accessing
RSU1 and RSU2 decreases. As shown in Figure 5, the ESS
𝑥 = (0.14, 0.06, 0.23, 0.14, 0.06) in Figure 5(a) increases to
Figure 5(b) 𝑥 = (0.68, 0.3, 0.22, 0.33, 0.42) if𝑁2 decreases.
Figure 6 shows the service types’ effect on average
throughput.TheRSU’s price increases alongwith the increase
of the request file importance index (a), which makes the
number of vehicles accessing RSU decreases. Meanwhile,
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Table 3: Simulation parameter values.
Parameter Value
RSU’s transmission radius 𝑅 1000m
𝑆/𝑁 30 dB
Bandwidth𝑊 20MHz
Path loss exponent 𝛾 2
The congestion index 𝜑 1.2
Weight coefficient 𝛽 0.15
Weight coefficient 𝛿 0.1
Weight coefficient Φ 0.1
1 2 3 4 5 6
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
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ro
ug
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ut
Throughput of vehicles accessing RSU1
Throughput of vehicles accessing RSU2
Throughput of vehicles accessing RSU3
a
Figure 6: The request service type on throughput.
the average bandwidth which the RSU assigned to vehicles
increases as the population did not change, which makes the
average throughput increase.
Figure 7 represents the load balancing of RSUs. RSU’s
pricing and the average bandwidth maintain stable when the
number of vehicles in communities is the same, which makes
the traffic load balancing; RSU’s traffic load retained around
0.99. The number changing leads to the changing of RSU’s
pricing and the probability of accessing RSU, so the RSU’s
balance index decreased to 0.92.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have set up an evolutionary game model to
formulate the competition among vehicles in the same com-
munity and different communities with bounded rationality
in VANET for RSU access problem. We have investigated
the dynamic evolutionary process of ESS when vehicles
drive through RSU. A vehicle accesses RSU based on its
payoff, which is a function of throughput and cost. The
dynamics of RSU access has been mathematically modeled
by the replicator dynamics that describes the adaptation in
proportions of vehicles accessing different RSUs.The ESS has
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Figure 7: The effect on balance index of the number of vehicles in
community.
been considered to be the stable solution for which all vehi-
cles receive identical payoff from difference RSUs. Detailed
analyses have shown the evolutionary process. Besides, in the
simulation result we can know that the package size, vehicle
speed, and the number of vehicles in community have effects
on the ESS, which then affect the network throughput and
load balancing.
Due to the limited communication time between vehicles
and RSU, in the future work, we can use cooperative down-
load method to improve the network throughput.
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